efficiency and evaluates how closely the private health insurance market meets the structural norms that economists have developed to gauge efficiency. Data are presented which show that consumers are poorly informed about their health insurance coverage; it is argued that this is due to the complex array of coverages that are available from both public and private payers. Using this framework, the article concludes with a discussion of public policy interventions that might improve the efficiency of health care coverage for the elderly.
B a c k g r o u n c i

Medicare
The Medicare program is the foundation of health care coverage for the elderly. Over 98 percent of the elderly have Medicare Part A coverage, and 97 percent purchase Part B at a monthly premium of $ 24.80 (Waldo and Lazenby 1984) . Part A coverage consists primarily of hospital care. Hospital costs are covered with the following exceptions: there is an initial deductible during each " benefit period" (set at $520 in 1987), and there are daily copayments equal to one-fourth of this deductible for stays lasting between 61 and 90 days. Furthermore, each Medicare beneficiary is allotted 60 lifetime reserve days with daily copayments of one-half of the deductible. Part A also covers an unlimited number of qualifying home health visits. In theory, it also covers some nursing home care: for qualifying stays, the first 20 days are covered fully and the next 80 days are covered after a daily copayment of one-eighth the deductible (currently $65) is met. In reality. Medicare coverage for nursing home care is almost nonexistent, because, as described below, restrictions on coverage have been enacted to ensure that only acute care episodes are covered.
Part B coverage pays part of physician and some other medical services. After the patient pays a $75 annual deductible. Medicare reimburses 80 percent of the " reasonable charge" for each physician service. The patient is responsible for paying the remaining 20 percent, as well as all charges in excess of the reasonable charge whenever the physician does not accept assignment on the service. Medicare does not pay any of the costs of prescription drugs, eyeglasses, hearing aids, or physical examinations. All combined. Medicare paid for 44 percent of the elderly's personal health expenditures in 1986 (Waldo, Levit, and Lazenby 1986) .
At the time of writing, the Senate and the House of Representatives have each passed legislation that will substantially modify Medicare's benefit package. The bill that eventually is enacted by Congress is likely to remove the copayments on hospital stays lasting for more than 60 days, and to cover hospital stays of any length. It is also possible that a prescription drug benefit will be added to the program, which pays for 80 percent of charges after an annual deductible of approximately $500 is met. Furthermore, total liability incurred by any beneficiary for the Part A and Part B deductibles and copayments is likely to be capped, probably at a level below $2,000 annually. Some implications of these changes are touched upon in the last part of the article.
Medicaid
For some of the poor and near-poor elderly, the Medicaid program provides coverage for many of the gaps in Medicare. Typically, states purchase Part B coverage for Medicaid eligibles. Although the precise benefit package varies by state, Medicaid benefits usually cover all Medicare deductibles and copayments, and often cover some items left uncovered by Medicare, such as prescription drugs and dental care (Davis and Rowland 1986) . One of the program's most important roles is that of providing nursing home care. To become eligible, however, one has to meet the program's income and asset restrictions. In practice, this means that noneligibles wishing coverage must im poverish themselves by "spending down " their income and assets. In 1984, Medicaid paid for 14 percent of the elderly's health care costs, but almost 42 percent of their nursing home expenses. Other government programs, such as the Veterans Administration, paid for another 6 percent of total expenditures (Waldo and Lazenby 1984) .
Private Health Insurance
Since the beginning of the Medicare program over twenty years ago, private health insurance companies have sold policies to the elderly that have provided coverage for some of the copayments and services left uncovered by Medicare. Because these policies to some extent cover the gaps in the Medicare program, they have been coined "medigap" policies.
The elderly population has shown much interest in obtaining medigap coverage. In 1984, it was estimated that 72 percent of the elderly (18 million people) owned some type of private supplemental insurance, and that 80 percent had either private policies or Medicaid coverage to supplement Medicare (Gordon 1986) . This includes over 30 percent of the elderly, who have policies sponsored by their employers or former employers, where the latter pay the majority of premiums (Short and Monheit 1986) . The Health Care Financing Administration estimates that all private health insurance policies pay for 7.2 percent of personal health expenditures incurred by the elderly (Waldo and Lazenby 1984) .
Although the so-called "gap-filling" policies receive most publicity and are subject to the most regulation, there are other types of supplemental insurance as well. The most common of these is the hospital indemnity policy, which usually provides a fixed sum per day when the policy holder is hospitalized. Another type, the specifieddisease policy, pays benefits only if a particular disease (usually cancer) is contracted. The little evidence available about these policies indicates that they provide somewhat lower returns on premiums than do the gap-filling ones (McCall, Rice, and Hall 1987) . Finally, some ben eficiaries who still are employed have major medical policies that supplement Medicare, and others are covered by a health maintenance organization.
Although no data are available on the total amount of money spent annually on supplemental insurance premiums, one can make an ap proximation. The average elderly person has approximately 1.25 policies (McCall, Rice, and Hall 1983) , giving a total of 22.5 million policies. About four-fifths of these policies (18 million) were the more expensive gap-filling type, while the remaining one-fifth provided indemnity benefits at about one-half the cost (McCall, Rice, and Hall 1983) . In 1977 the former cost about $300 (Cafferata 1984) ; we can infer that the latter cost about $150. If individual policy premiums rose at the same rate as overall medical care inflation during the ensuing years, in 1984 total premium expenditures would have been $11.4 billion and in 1986, $13.0 billion. These figures are corroborated by examining other recent data. In 1984 personal health expenditures for the elderly paid for by private insurance amounted to $8.7 billion (Waldo and Lazenby 1984) . This is consistent with the $11.4 billion figure if, on average, insurance companies keep 24 percent of premium dollars for administration and profit, that is, if their " loss ratios" were 76 percent. A recent report by the U. S. General Accounting Office (1986) , discussed later, provides premium and loss ratio data for a sample of Blue-Cross/Blue Shield and commercial policies. Weighting these loss ratios by premiums, one comes up with exactly this 76 percent figure. Consequently, the $13 billion figure for 1986 is probably relatively accurate.
Not only are medigap policies prevalent, but they are controversial as well. Two of the earliest critical studies of medigap policies were published in 1978 (U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Aging 1978; DeNova and Shearer 1978). They stated, among other things, that individuals were put under undue pressure by agents to purchase policies, that policies often provided few benefits, that some people had many overlapping policies, and that consumers had little idea about what they were buying. Many of these same criticisms were echoed in a recent report by the Harvard Medicare Project (Blumenthal et al. 1986 ). Others have been less critical. For example. Consumer Reports (1984) rated over 30 medigap policies and recommended that elderly individuals purchase one of the more highly rated of the policies.
One result of the controversy that has surrounded medigap policies is that the federal government has become involved in regulating them, something heretofore left to the states in insurance matters. In 1980 Congress enacted Public Law 96-265. Section 507 of this statute is commonly known as the Baucus amendments; it established voluntary certification requirements for medigap policies. To be certified under the legislation as "Medicare supplements," policies must cover all Medicare hospital copayments from days 6 l to 90 of a stay ($130 per day in 1987), the copayments for the 60 lifetime-reserve days for hospital stays over 90 days ($260 per day), 90 percent of costs for stays lasting up to one more year, and the 20 percent coinsurance on physician services, subject to a maximum deductible of $200 and a minimum of at least $5,000 in Part B coverage annually (Cafferata 1985) . Policies sold by certain groups must have expected loss ratios of at least 75 percent; those sold to individuals as well as massmarketed group policies are required to have minimum expected loss ratios of 60 percent. (Interestingly, the Department of Health and Human Services has not interpreted this as requiring that actual loss ratios meet these levels, only that the companies' anticipated revenues and claims expenses be above the minimum [U . S. General Accounting Office 1986] .) Furthermore, the legislation has a variety of other requirements, such as restrictions on the use of clauses limiting policy payment for preexisting medical conditions, and mandating that com panies distribute consumer guides and outlines of policy benefits to prospective buyers. All but four states have adopted the Baucus re quirements, and most of the few which have not (Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, and Wyoming) have established equally stringent requirements.
Partly as a result of the Baucus legislation, there is now a standard benefit package included in medigap policies, although many policies provide additional coverage. (It should further be noted that certain policies-notably those providing indemnity and specified disease ben efits, and those which were converted from group to individual policies when a person retired-are not subject to the legislation.) In a 1982 survey conducted in six states (Rice and McCall 1985) , it was found that practically all gap-filling policies now cover the initial hospital deductible, which is not required under the federal legislation; all hospital copayments for stays up to 150 days; 90 percent of costs for stays lasting another year; and the 20 percent copayment on physician services up to at least $5,000 of coverage annually. About one-half of policies cover the $75 Part B deductible, but fewer than one-half cover any prescription drugs or any physician charges in excess of Medicare's customary, prevailing, and reasonable level (Rice and McCall 1985) . Almost no policies cover 100 percent of physician charges for nonassigned services. Furthermore, practically none provide benefits for nursing home stays that are not covered by Medicare, or coverage for appliances such as eyeglasses and hearing aids.
It is unclear exactly how medigap policy benefits will be altered as a result of the legislation now before Congress, which was discussed earlier. A likely possibility is that the policies will cover all or a large percentage of the out-of-pocket liability up to the annual cap. For example, if a $500 Part A and $1,000 Part B cap are enacted, medigap policies may cover the Part A liability in full, and all or a large part of the Part B liability. This might include coverage for some of the deductibles and copayments if a prescription drug benefit is added to the Medicare program. It is unlikely that medigap policies will extend their coverage to include nursing home stays not covered by Medicare, or provide any extra coverage for nonassigned physician services in excess of the Medicare reasonable charge.
The Nature o f the Medigap Market
Before embarking on an economic evaluation, it is necessary to clarify just what is being evaluated. In the next section, I will examine what I will refer to as the "medigap market/' that is, the market that has developed in which private supplemental health insurance policies are sold to Medicare beneficiaries. Although this market bears little re semblance to standard economic ones, such as those for particular agricultural commodities, it is a market nonetheless.
The standard concept of a market is as follows: Suppose there are several firms, A through F, selling goods or services. Furthermore, let there be a high degree of substitutability between the product sold by firms A, B, and C, but little between these firms' product and that sold by D, E, and F. (In economic terms, there is a high cross-price elasticity of demand among the first three firms' products, but a low elasticity between the two groupings of firms.) We might then loosely characterize the first three firms as constituting a market.
In the most general sense, the product we are dealing with in this article is protection against high out-of-pocket costs. Consumers have a few choices in this regard, and one would suspect that they are somewhat substitutable (i.e., part of the same market). These would include the typical medigap policies, hospital indemnity policies, cancer policies, and probably health maintenance organizations (HMOs). HMOs are an interesting case in point: they usually provide more extensive coverage for the elderly than do traditional medigap policies. For example, prescription drugs are commonly covered after a small copayment is paid. HMO policies are designed to cover the same contingencies, however, as medigap policies (acute care illnesses), usually do not cost much more, and can be purchased by anyone who has access to an HMO. Are there types of financial protection that are not part of the medigap market.^ One obvious example is nursing home insurance. These policies typically cover nursing home stays lasting up to several years in length, and allow the policy holder to receive benefits in homes other than Medicare-approved skilled nursing facilities. Their benefits are not at all substitutable with those of medigap policies. Another, perhaps more interesting example would be life care com munities, which provide all medical services to elderly residents who pay a very large initiation fee in addition to monthly payments. These communities are now selected by only a tiny minority of wealthy elderly, and cannot be thought of as highly substitutable with medigap policies.
Perhaps the most peculiar aspect of the medigap market is its dependence on the federal government. Although all markets are affected by government regulations, tax policies, and so on, the re lationship is usually an indirect one. But the very existence of the medigap industry depends on the Medicare policy established by Congress. If Congress extends Medicare to cover unlimited hospital stays, for example, medigap policies will have to alter their coverage to account for this. More extreme than this would be comprehensive, government-financed health insurance for the elderly, which would probably wipe out medigap policies as we know them.
Economic Efficiency in the Supplemental Health Insurance Market
There is no simple formula one can use to assess whether a market is competitive and, therefore, operating efficiently. Although we do expect certain outcomes from a perfectly competitive market, such as price being equal to the marginal cost of production, comparing an actual market to such a norm as this is not appropriate. In most markets like the one for insurance, we cannot expect there to be perfect competition; in fact, these markets are regulated partly for just this reason. A more appropriate way to assess efficiency is not to use the standards of perfect competition but to look at the effects on efficiency of changes in the market: if changes could increase the degree of efficiency of the market, then obviously there is room for improvement. If there exists no change that could improve the per formance of the market, then it is operating at peak efficiency. This is the approach taken later in this article.
Nonetheless, it is still very useful to examine the structure of a market using the norms of competition. By doing this, we can pinpoint areas in which there appear to be major competitive problems and, thus, we can focus on them when examining measures of market outcomes. Furthermore, examining how well a market meets these norms will help us assess the anticipated effectiveness of policy changes aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of market structure.
With this in mind, there are five structural conditions which, if fulfilled, ensure that a market operates efficiently (Henderson and Quandt 1971) : (1) The goods being produced are homogeneous; (2) there are numerous producers and consumers in the market; (3) consumers possess good information concerning prices of goods and their char acteristics, as well as those of substitute goods; (4) there is free entry into and exit from the market; and (5) there are no external effects in consumption or production. (An externality occurs when someone other than the consumer or producer incurs benefits or costs from an economic activity.) In a so-called monopolistically competitive market that exists for many consumer goods, the assumption of product homogeneity is relaxed in recognition that firms will wish to differentiate their product from those of competitors.
At first glance it appears that the supplemental insurance market possesses most of the structural characteristics ensuring efficiency, although, in part, this may be due to the imposition of the Baucus regulations. First, there appears to be a basic homogeneous product in the market (a policy that fulfills the minimum Baucus standards), and which pays for part or all of the initial hospital deductible. Some policies provide a higher degree of protection for a higher price by covering some prescription expenses and physician charges up to the insurance company's usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) charge level. Most analysts would agree that the opportunity to choose among several policies, all of which meet certain minimum coverages, enhances the degree of economic efficiency.
With respect to the second and fourth competitive conditions, the medigap market again appears largely to meet the competitive norms. Although national data are generally lacking because insurance is regulated through the states, it appears that there are a large number of firms engaged in selling medigap policies. A recent study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1986) examined a dozen states that contain about 30 percent of the country's Medicare beneficiaries, and found 111 companies that had sold 398 different medigap policies during 1984. With respect to entry, although insurance is regulated in all states, the above figures indicate that lack of free entry into the market does not constitute an important problem.
Meeting the fifth condition (the absence of externalities) may be a problem, but we cannot know this for sure. The primary externality we are concerned with is what economists might refer to as a "positive consumption"' externality. If members of society receive some satisfaction in knowing that the elderly are protected against the risk of catastrophic illness expenses, then it might be in society's best interest to have the government provide such coverage. Relying on the market could be inefficient because some people would not purchase coverage, either because they could not afford it or did not want it, which, in turn, would imply that persons possessing the aforementioned altruism would be unsatisfied.
The problem with gauging the extent, if any, of this potential market failure relates to the information problem, discussed in detail below. I will argue later that consumers do not know much about what Medicare covers or what additional protection is received from medigap policies. Consumers are also unaware of any remaining gaps. If most people do not know what is best for them (or their parents), it is difficult for them to know whether they will want to help finance additional coverage for other elderly persons as well. Consequently, until the problem of consumer information is cleared up, it is hard to assess whether society wishes to provide additional coverage for those who currently are unprotected. Given that most elderly have shown an interest in protecting themselves by purchasing policies, however, and that those who do not have coverage tend to be less well off financially, it is not difficult to envision that society does wish to provide more coverage. Thus, there may be some degree of market failure in this regard.
What remains is the third competitive condition-consumer in formation. Unlike the others, it appears that there is an enormous problem with fulfillment of this condition, which I will argue has resulted in a serious failure of the medigap market. The next two subsections examine the degree to which consumers lack information about the medigap market, and the problems that have arisen as a result.
The Problem o f Consumer Ignorance
One of the many unresolved issues in health economic theory concerns what constitutes adequate information about a market. In one oftcited debate about this issue, Pauly (1978) and Sloan and Feldman (1978) point out that a market can operate efficiently without everyone being well informed. They argue that so long as there are some number of purchasers possessing the knowledge, prices may be kept at competitive levels. Reinhardt (1978) , on the other hand, argues that the previous authors look at competition in too limited a context. Whereas everyone need not be well informed for price to reach equilibrium at a competitive level, everyone does need information if he is to choose the product that maximizes his own utility. In other words, the purpose of good information in a market is not just to keep the price down, but also to ensure that consumers choose the particular products that are right for them.
From this viewpoint, which I believe to be the more appropriate one, one of the things that matters in the efficient operation of a market is that consumers understand a market well enough to make rational choices. Unfortunately, consumers do not appear to be nearly knowledgeable enough in the areas of Medicare and medigap benefits. A recent study of consumer knowledge of Medicare and medigap policies (McCall, Rice, and Sangl 1986 ) provides a review of research findings in this area. Briefly, studies of consumer information about Medicare program benefits (Lambert 1980; LaTour, Friedman, and Hughes 1983) show that beneficiaries have, at best, a very uneven understanding of these benefits. Whereas they appear to have a general knowledge that Medicare will not pay for all physician services, nor for products such as prescription drugs and eyeglasses, most beneficiaries understand little more. In particular, they almost totally lack any meaningful understanding of their liabilities for infrequent medical events that may have grave financial consequences-long hospital stays and nursing home care. For example, only about 35 percent of ben eficiaries know that Medicare provides coverage for hospital stays over 30 days, and a similarly small proportion understand that Medicare will not cover a six-month nursing home stay (McCall, Rice, and Sangl 1986) .
Another study of beneficiary knowledge, not reported in the above literature review, provides perhaps the most disturbing indication of beneficiary ignorance. The American Association of Retired Persons (1984) (AARP) conducted a survey of its members and found that almost 80 percent think that Medicare will help pay for a nursing home stay lasting a month, and most of these people believe that Medicare will pay for the majority of costs. Similarly, 50 percent say that their private health insurance policy will contribute. Although we don't know exactly how often Medicare and medigap pay something toward a nursing home stay, we can say that the beliefs of the elderly with regard to overall generosity of coverage are seriously in error. Medicare and private insurance combined pay for only about 2 percent of the elderly's nursing home expenses (Waldo and Lazenby 1984) .
Exactly how and why it is that Medicare and, thus, medigap policies cover so little nursing home care is beyond the scope of this article; good explanations appear in Feder and Scanlon (1982) and Smits, Feder, and Scanlon (1982) . In broad terms. Medicare provides only acute care benefits; program policies have developed in a way to ensure that chronic nursing home care is excluded from coverage. For example, not only must a nursing home stay meet certain restrictions designed to cover only acute care-it must take place in a Medicare-approved skilled nursing facility, and follow a hospital stay of at least three days, with admission to the nursing home coming within 30 days of the hospital discharge-but even if these conditions are met, it is difficult for a chronically ill patient's stay to qualify for Medicare reimbursement. Because Medicare has traditionally focused on acute care, it usually requires that the patient have rehabilitation potential, something most long-staying patients have difficulty meeting.
Adequate knowledge of the medigap market should also include understanding of the expected costs o f illness, which, in turn, means that beneficiaries should have some idea of the probability of incurring out-of-pocket costs, as well as the number of dollars involved. Perhaps it is not surprising that Medicare beneficiaries do not have much information about these things. In the study by Lambert (1980) , respondents were asked several questions, including the percentage of medical expenses paid by Medicare, the cost of a day in the hospital, hospital length of stay, and the likelihood of staying in a hospital for 60 days. In general, few beneficiaries knew much about any of these.
Unfortunately, beneficiary knowledge of medigap policies is equally poor. The review cited above also discusses this literature; other note worthy studies include Lambert (1980) , A.D. Little (1982 ), Cafferata (1984 , and McCall, Rice, and Sangl (1986) . The latter two studies are particularly interesting because beneficiary responses were compared with actual copies of their medigap policies. Among other things, the first of these two studies reports that only 40 percent of beneficiaries know whether their policies cover skilled nursing home care. The latter study reaches a similar conclusion. In addition, it finds that fewer than 40 percent know if their policies cover hospital stays of over 150 days, or cover custodial care. The only area in which beneficiaries show a high degree of knowledge (over 80 percent correctly answering) concerns coverage for prescription drugs.
The fact that beneficiaries know so little about events that occur infrequently may not be surprising, but it provides strong a priori evidence that the medigap market will not function properly. The overriding purpose of insurance is to provide financial protection against uncertain, costly events. It is precisely these events-hospitalization and nursing home institutionalization-that beneficiaries do not un derstand. Consequently, we might expect that they will be unable to choose policies that provide the most cost-effective financial protection. As noted earlier, however, the question of primary importance is not simply whether there is a problem in the market, but whether there are changes we could enact that would improve market functioning. This issue will be addressed below.
The Consequences o f Consumer Ignorance
In the previous section, it was argued that one structural irregularity in the medigap market-poor consumer information-could seriously impair the efficiency of the market. Whether in fact this is the case should be examined directly, by examining market outcomes.
The previous discussion of the issues raised by Pauly (1978), Sloan and Feldman (1978) , and Reinhardt (1978) indicates that we should be looking at two outcomes: whether consumers are buying the coverage that best suits their needs (which are defined below), and whether the coverage that they do purchase is priced competitively. If either of these outcomes is not evident, then we need to think about whether there are policy measures available to bring it about.
Are Consumers Buying Policies that Suit Their Needs? Not surprisingly, there is no direct method of assessing whether consumers are acting in a "rational" manner-that is, behaving in a way that is most nearly in their best interests. An indirect method used by economists is to construct a theory of "optimal" consumer behavior, based on certain assumptions of consumer rationality, and to examine whether consumers are behaving in this manner.
The economic theory of insurance predicts that utility maximizing, risk-averse individuals will want to purchase insurance for a potentially high-cost illness whose occurrence is subject to a great deal of uncertainty. That is, they will want to insure against low-likelihood, high-cost illness. Conversely, such persons will find it less worth their while to purchase coverage for events that have a high likelihood, because it will be cheaper to self-insure (Feldstein 1983) . The reason that self-insurance is cheaper for high-likelihood events is that the person will have to pay the expected costs of the illness in higher premiums even if insurance is purchased. Furthermore, premiums will reflect the administrative costs of processing these claims; with self-insurance, the latter costs are avoided.
A strong case can be made that the purchases of medigap policies are inconsistent with what would be predicted by the theory of insurance. First, it appears that consumers are purchasing too much first-dollar coverage, items for which they could be self-insuring (that is, paying out-of-pocket when the service is incurred rather than paying out-ofpocket in the form of higher annual premiums). Over 90 percent of medigap policy owners purchase coverage that pays the entire Part A hospital deductible, and about one-half purchase policies covering the Part B deductible (Rice and McCall 1985; Cafferata 1984) . Two possible explanations for this phenomenon, discussed in an early work by Keeler, Morrow, and Newhouse (1977) , are that consumer purchases of medigap policies are often subsidized by employers (making any coverage, including deductibles, worth their while), and that there may be tax advantages for individual purchasers that would make it desirable for most to purchase deductible coverage. Substantial tax advantages could make it more desirable to purchase medigap policies that cover deductibles, because the government shares in the cost of the policy through the tax deductions. The first reason does not appear to be consistent with the evidence: purchase of the deductibles is almost as high among individuals as it is for those whose policies are subsidized by employers (Cafferata 1984) . Neither does the second reason provide an adequate explanation. In 1977, the year that the National Medical Care Expenditures Survey (NMCES) was conducted, fewer than 20 percent of the elderly itemized medical expenses (U. S. Internal Revenue Service 1978) ; consequently, relatively few individuals received tax breaks when they purchased medigap policies. The low proportion of elderly who itemize medical expenses, therefore, is not enough to explain the high purchase rates of deductibles.
Nevertheless, it is not hard to come up with reasons as to why the elderly may want to purchase insurance for deductibles. The most plausible one is that since they do not understand what gaps exist in Medicare, they desire coverage for all gaps. They may also balk at the size of the initial hospital deductible, although it should be noted that this sum is comparable to the annual premium of the typical medigap policy. Finally, they may prefer to have a fixed annual expenditure in the form of a medigap premium than risk the uncertain expenditure on one or more hospital deductibles. More important than the over-purchase of first-dollar coverage, however, is the under-purchase of catastrophic coverage.
Although there is no generally agreed-upon definition of ''catastrophic*' medical occurrences, I will use it to connote medical events that can have the potential of seriously depleting a family's resources (see Wyszewianski [1986] for a fuller discussion). One of the problems one faces in analyzing this issue is that almost all recent studies are based on only one group of elderly-the so called "noninstitutionalized," in effect, those not in nursing homes. This focus is due to the large amount of out-of-pocket cost data collected on the noninstitutionalized by NMCES (conducted in 1977) and the National Medical Care Uti lization and Expenditure Survey (NMCUES) conducted in 1980. Con versely, there is a dearth of data on out-of-pocket payments by those in nursing homes, although, as noted below, two studies have tried to construct such a data base synthetically.
Two studies concerning the out-of-pocket costs of the noninsti tutionalized are noteworthy. In a recent study, Kovar (1986) uses data from NMCUES to examine noninstitutionalized out-of-pocket payments. One finding was that whether a person is hospitalized has a large effect on out-of-pocket costs. In 1980 the mean out-of-pocket expenditures (excluding insurance premiums) for persons who were hospitalized were about $650 (7.8 percent of family income) whereas they were only $202 (3.2 percent of income) for those not in the hospital. Another study using NM CUES, conducted by the U.S.
Congressional Budget Office (Gordon 1986), also looked at acute care expenditures. Not surprisingly, it found that among the nonhospitalized, those without medigap policies had lower out-of-pocket payments (including premiums), presumably because they did not have to pay these insurance premiums. Those with a hospitalization, however, paid much less out-of-pocket if they had a medigap policy. For example, it is estimated that 0.8 percent of medigap owners had a hospital stay that reached the coinsurance stage (over 60 days), and their outof-pocket costs that year were $1,900. Among the 0.3 percent of nonowners with a stay of that length, average out-of-pocket costs were over $10,000. Clearly, if one has a long hospital stay, it is advantageous to have a medigap policy.
Although studies like this provide useful data, reliance on them gives a distorted picture of the extent to which medigap policies protect the elderly. (It should be noted that the authors make it quite clear that their findings refer only to the noninstitutionalized.) When one looks at the entire elderly population, including those who are in nursing homes, a much bleaker picture emerges.
Before going into these studies, it should be pointed out that it is easy to underestimate the significance of nursing home expenditures because of the way national data are collected. NM CUES, for example, represents 95 percent of the elderly population during 1980-that is, those not in a nursing home during that year. It is tempting to believe, therefore, that the results reflect the out-of-pocket experiences of the vast majority, but this is simply not true. Whereas it may be true that 95 percent live in the community in any one year, it is also true that at some point in their lifetime over 40 percent of the elderly enter a nursing home (Cohen, Tell, and Wallack 1986) . Focusing on one year, therefore, understates the magnitude of the risk of nursing home care. From a policy standpoint, our goal is to reduce the possibility that elderly persons will incur catastrophic out-of-pocket costs at any point in their lifetime. Viewed in such a way, protection against the costs of nursing home stays becomes a critical component of complete catastrophic protection.
Two recent studies (Rice and Gabel 1986; ICF 1985) attempt to examine the entire elderly population by creating a data base that includes both the institutionalized and noninstitutionalized. Because no such data base exists, it is necessary to create one by merging together selective data on the noninstitutionalized (NMCUES) and those in nursing homes (the National Nursing Home Survey [NNHS], conducted in 1976 and 1977) . Synthetic estimation techniques are fraught with problems. In this case, one has to eliminate the overlap between the data bases, compensate for the fact that they were conducted in different years, and, most important, find a method to estimate out-of-pocket costs and costs covered by medigap policies for nursing home patients because such data are not directly available from the N N H S. Rice and Gabel (1986) examined the extent to which medigap policies pay for high health care costs. They concluded that medigap policies provide increasingly thorough coverage as total health care costs rise when health care costs are less than $7,500 annually (in 1980 dollars), but, after that, the share paid by medigap declines. Medigap policies pay 7.3 percent of costs for persons with annual expenditures below $500, and this percentage rises to 19.1 percent for those with expenses between $5,000 and $7,500. These policies, however, pay only 8.7 percent for persons with expenses above $7,500 annually. Conversely, out-of-pocket costs decline to a low of 17.1 percent of total expenditures up to the $7,500 level, but rise to 24.0 percent when expenses exceed $7,500. This pattern occurs largely because if a person's health care costs reach the $7,500 level it is very likely that he or she has been in a nursing home. The study also looked at what services are responsible for high levels of out-of-pocket expenditures. For persons with less than $2,000 in out-of-pocket costs, acute care services were almost entirely the cause, comprising over 90 percent of these costs. For those with over $2,000 in annual outof-pocket costs, however, over 80 percent of these costs were due to nursing home stays.
The ICF study also broke costs down by institutional status, and found that although the elderly pay for 25 percent of health costs out-of-pocket, the proportion paid by the institutionalized (3^ percent) is twice that of the noninstitutionalized (19 percent). The study further examined family health expenditures as a percentage of income. It reported that whereas 8.6 percent of the average household's total income is spent out of pocket (either directly or in premium payments), this varies dramatically by age. The figure is 4.2 percent for those with the head of household aged 65 to 69, but rises to 37.5 percent when the head is over 85 years of age. Although this is due partly to different income levels by age, the primary reason is the risk of entering a nursing home.
Another example of the financial consequences of nursing home stays is illustrated in a study conducted in Massachusetts (U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Aging 1985). Using survey data from 900 Massachusetts elderly who were living at home, the study examined how long it would take elderly persons in a nursing home to spend-down their income and assets, and thus become eligible for Medicaid. The authors found that one-half of 75-year-olds would spend-down in only 13 weeks, and that over 60 percent of those living alone would do so in that time. Three-fourths of 75-year-olds would spend-down within a year. The study concludes that " the likelihood of impoverishment is extremely high if an elderly person is placed in a nursing home or needs extensive home care on a prolonged basis" (U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Aging 1985, 54).
I believe that to a large extent the elderly's lack of coverage for catastrophic events is due to lack of knowledge about their vulnerability, or to denial-an unwillingness to confront the fact that they might enter a nursing home at some point in their lives. Currently, there are dozens of policies available that cover the costs of long-term nursing home care, but less than 1 percent of the elderly have purchased them. There are reasons other than ignorance or denial to explain the lack of success of nursing home insurance policies, however. Although there are many policies on the market that cover long-term care services, they are not well publicized, and many tend to have high premiums because the population served is at high risk of institu tionalization. Annual premiums vary from $75 to $1,800 for a 65 to 69-year-old, to $150 to $2600 for a 70 to 74-year-old, and can be much higher for someone who is aged 80 (Schaeffer 1987) . The primary cause of this variation is probably the extent of coverage for nursing home and home care services, which varies considerably according to the particular policy. Furthermore, some of the elderly may correctly perceive that if they incur catastrophic long-term care costs, the government will pay for them. For this to occur, however, they must first become poor by spending-down their assets to be eligible for Medicaid coverage, something which few seem to understand.
There are other reasons to believe that consumer ignorance is partly responsible for the low popularity of products that can provide protection against catastrophic out-of-pocket costs. Besides nursing home care, the two primary gaps in Medicare and medigap policies are unassigned physician services liability and prescription drugs. Both of these are commonly covered almost in full by HMOs. In June 1986, however, only 3 percent of Medicare beneficiaries received their coverage through HMOs, compared to about 10 percent of the population under the age of 65 (McMillan, Lubitz, and Russell 1987) . Although this number is growing with liberalized federal regulations toward Medicare-certified HMOs, it would still appear that ignorance about Medicare and medigap policies is partly responsible for the relative unpopularity of HMOs among this population. It is true that the elderly population is largely unused to HMOs and has already established physician relationships. Nevertheless, if they were to understand the cost advantages of many HMOs, more would consider joining. I have argued that one manifestation of poor consumer information is that the elderly have not purchased insurance coverage that protects them against potentially catastrophic costs. Whether the policies they do purchase are priced appropriately is considered next.
Are Medigap Policies Priced Competitively? Earlier, it was noted that another way to evaluate whether a market is performing well is to see whether the product being sold is priced competitively. Private insurance policies do not return all premium dollars as benefits for several reasons: they need to make a profit; they may spend considerable amounts on advertising; claims processing and administration are costly; and they may need to keep some of the premiums to insure against unanticipated disbursements, a so-called "risk premium."
Although all of the above expenses may be perfectly legitimate, in assessing whether a policy change should be implemented it is important to consider the alternatives, and one alternative-^which will be discussed in detail later-is having the Medicare program supply the coverage now being provided by medigap policies. Traditionally, the Medicare program spends about 3 percent of its disbursements on administration: 2 percent for Part A and 5 percent for Part B (U.S. Health Care Financing Administration 1983).
Given the size of the medigap market, it is surprising how little information exists on policy return rates. Only during the last year has any systematic information been compiled, from a study conducted by the U. S. General Accounting Office (1986) The study found that policies sold by Blue-Cross/Blue Shield plans have average loss ratios of 81.1 percent, but those sold by commercial insurers averaged loss ratios of only 60.2 percent. Furthermore, the latter figure was raised substantially by the fact that the largest com mercial insurer. Prudential, had a loss ratio of 77.9 percent. Ratios for the remaining 97 commercial insurers averaged substantially less than 60 percent.
One must be careful in drawing too many conclusions from one set of loss ratios. New policies tend to have low loss ratios initially because they typically have fewer incurred claims during the first few years due both to a relatively healthy cohort of policy holders and to preexisting-condition clauses in policies. Once this cohort matures and the preexisting-condition clauses expire, the loss ratio will typically adjust to its long-run level.
Furthermore, the 1984 data used in the study may reflect the substantial decrease in hospital admissions and length of stay which occurred at the onset of D RG s. It could be argued that this large, unanticipated decline in policy liabilities resulted in lower loss ratios than was the case in previous years. The U .S. General Accounting Office study also examined the loss ratios from 1982 and 1983. For commercial insurers, the loss ratios went from 59.2 percent in 1982 to 65.3 percent in 1983 65.3 percent in to 60.2 percent in 1984 Blue-Cross/BlueShield plans, the figures were 93.7 percent, 91.3 percent, and 81.1 percent, respectively. For Blue-Cross/Blue-Shield, then, the 1984 figures do appear to be lower than the historical trend. This does not appear to be the case, however, for the commercial insurers.
How "low" are these figures? This depends on what they are compared to. Two comparisons of interest are how they rate with all group insurance sold in the United States, and how they compare with all individual policies. According to industry reports (A.M. Best Company 1986), the average loss ratio for all commercial group accident and health policies sold between 1980 and 1984 was 100 percent, whereas the average for other (individual) accident and health policies was 64 percent. The 100 percent figure for group policies indicates that the industry was unprofitable over this period, since companies must still cover administrative costs. But it is noteworthy that the figures for the medigap market are no lower than for the market for other individual policies-that is, policies sold to the nonelderly.
Nevertheless, if a person desires health insurance coverage, it is clear that they will get much more for their money if they are part of a group; note the high loss ratios for group insurance policies and Medicare's relatively low administrative costs. It is not surprising that group coverage will provide much better returns on premiums; not only do the companies avoid the bulk of agent commissions and experience economies of scale in claims processing, but the nature of group insurance helps avoid adverse selection-that is, sicker people purchasing the coverage. One can, therefore, conclude that elderly consumers desiring medigap coverage would do better if they were part of a group. Since the elderly largely are not part of the labor force, however, there is no convenient way to organize such a group privately that will avoid adverse selection. An alternative would be for the government to provide coverage to all Medicare beneficiaries through an expansion of program benefits. There are several points that need to be considered before making such a large policy change, and they are discussed next.
Improving the Efficiency of Health Care Coverage for the Elderly
In the previous sections it was argued that the market for medigap policies is not functioning very well due in large part to consumer ignorance; the elderly are not buying coverage that best suits their needs (as demonstrated by the low enrollment in HMOs and small demand for nursing home coverage), and many of the policies they do buy provide low returns on their investments. The issue addressed here is why this situation has arisen, and what can be done to improve consumer understanding and, thus, health insurance choices.
One thing to be kept in mind when considering alternatives to the present types of coverage is the distinction between cost control and social efficiency. It is sometimes tempting to think that increased public spending is somehow inefficient, even if it results in a more equitable distribution of services. In fact, one need not have to raise the issues of equity to justify higher government expenditures, although they certainly can ju stify it. T h e issu e , rath er, is w h ether con su m ers are better o ff in to tal after a g o v e rn m e n t e . A fte r th at th e situ a tio n is very co n fu sin g , how ever.
Some policies p ay n o th in g ab ov e th e reason ab le ch arge for n o n assig n ed services, som e p ay a p e rc e n ta g e o f th e differen ce betw een the reasonable charge and the in su ran ce c o m p a n y 's u su al an d c u sto m ary rate (U C R ) level, som e p ay all o f th e d ifferen ce, an d a very few p o licie s pay so m e amount above the U C R level i f the p h y sic ia n 's b ille d ch arge is even higher. For p a tie n ts (or p h y sic ia n s, for th at m atter) to u n d erstan d their liab ility , they need to k n o w the reaso n ab le ch arge for a p articu lar service, the b ille d ch arge, the assig n m e n t sta tu s, an d perhaps the in surance c o m p a n y 's U C R level. F urth erm o re, in m ak in g an informed in surance d ecisio n , they m u st p red ict these th in g s in advance. It is no w onder that patien ts are perplexed when they discover that Medicare does not pay for 8 0 percen t o f p h ysician costs.
T h e situ a tio n for n u rsin g hom e care is the 
Acute Care
T h ere are a n u m b er o f p o ssib le w ays to im pro ve con sum er information con cern in g the financial risk o f acu te care c o sts. T w o related methods w ould be either to increase govern m en t regulations that require companies to disclose in fo rm atio n to co n su m e rs, or to have the g o v ern m en t itse lf provide the in fo rm atio n d ire ctly . O n the su rface, these w o u ld appear to be the m ost logical m eth ods because they deal directly w ith consum ers' lack o f in fo rm atio n , w h ich I a rg u e is la rg ely resp o n sib le for m ark et Increasing the q u a n tity o f in fo rm atio n m ay not increase the q u a lity of un derstan din g. A n " id e a l" so lu tio n o f p ro v id in g true catastro p h ic coverage th rou gh M ed icare, how ever, w h ile a llo w in g beneficiaries to self-insure for d e d u c tib le s, is u n lik ely to w ork because beneficiaries will continue to seek su p p le m e n ta tio n th ro u g h the priv ate m ark e t, 
Long-term Care
The problem o f co n su m er ig n o ran ce is p ro b ab ly even m ore severe in the area o f lo n g -te rm care. In la rg e m easu re, th is co m p le x ity is the result o f M ed icare's tra d itio n o f co v erin g on ly acute-care n u rsin g hom e and hom e health services that lead to a patien t's recovery after discharge from a h o sp ita l. B e cau se coverage d ecision s are m ade on a case-bycase b a sis, w ith o u t m u ch u n ifo rm ity (S m its, F eder, an d Scanlon 1982), it is very u n lik ely th at ad d itio n a l con su m er in form ation would be su fficien t to im p ro ve o u tco m es in the m ark e t.
It sh o u ld be m en tio n ed th at a m ajo r differen ce betw een acute and lo n g -te rm care is th at the form er is p ro v id e d m o stly by the medical p ro fessio n , w h ile the la tte r is larg ely don e by u n paid or " inform al" only from u n p a id sources (D o ty 1 9 8 6 ). F or reasons o f both cost and q u a lity , co n tin u atio n o f th is form o f care sh o u ld be encouraged. One o f the issu es th at m u st be con fron ted w hen con sid erin g the expansion o f M ed icare benefits is w h ether it w ill larg ely provide care for those w ho p rev io u sly had u n m e t n eeds, or i f the m ain effect w ill be a su b stitu tio n o f p a id for u n p a id sources o f care.
T h is article's focus is on th e p a id sources o f care, which in the case o f lo n g -te rm care is p rim a rily the n u rsin g hom e. For the sam e reasons as w ith acu te care, sim p lifica tio n o f the lo n g -term care benefit stm cture w ou ld ap p e ar to be the m o st p ro m isin g w ay to im prove consumer k n o w led ge , an d th u s allow th em to m ak e ration al coverage decisions.
O ne o b v iou s w ay to achieve th is, w hich avoid s any consum er decision m a k in g , w o u ld be for M ed icare to cover fu lly n ursin g home care, and perhaps hom e health care as w ell. There are som e serious drawbacks to such an exp an sion o f M ed icare, how ever. F irst, the cost would be ex ceed in gly h ig h ; in 1985 the e ld e rly 's ou t-of-po ck et costs for nursing Before d iscu ssin g so m e o f th ese o p tio n s, it is im p o rta n t to con fron t an objection often raised to th e ex p an sio n o f M ed icare in to the lo n g term care area: th at su ch services are n ot really " m e d ic a l" services, but rather largely room an d b oard co u p le d w ith assistan ce in person al care. Even i f th is is tru e , it m isse s th e p o in t o f w h at in surance is all about. I f one were to g r a n t th a t n u rsin g hom e care is larg ely c u sto d ia l, this does not lessen th e fact th a t th ose receiv in g care are su b je c t to catastrophic lo sses, a g a in st w h ich risk -averse in d iv id u a ls w ill w an t to protect th em selves. It is tru e th a t th e go v e rn m en t m ay w ish to lim it the degree to which it subsidizes these services. T h at can be accom plished, however, by ch a rg in g lo n g -te rm n u rsin g h om e p a tie n ts a p o rtio n o f their Social Secu rity in co m e w h ile they are resid en ts. Such a sy stem would have the o b v io u s a d v a n ta g e o f n ot req u irin g these peo p le to spend-down their a c c u m u la te d a ssets in ord er to receive coverage. O n ce a g a in , a review o f altern ative lo n g -term care coverage and finan cing stra te g ie s is beyond th e scope o f th is article. The point b ein g stressed here is th at any p rop osal for im p ro v in g health care coverage for the elderly m u st sim p lify the sy stem in order to facilitate w ise choices by con su m ers; th is ap p lie s to both acute and long-term care coverage. Furtherm ore, once consum ers have a better understanding o f th eir cov erages, they w ill be in a m u ch stro n ger position to make p o litic a l choices con cern in g how they w ish th eir legislators to reform the M ed icare p ro g ram .
Implications fo r Current Legislation
Ever sin ce P resid en t R e a g a n p rop osed the con cept in his 1986 state o f the u nion ad d ress to C o n g re ss, there has been a great deal of atten tio n p a id to e x te n d in g M ed icare benefits to cover " catastrophic c o s t s ." A s noted earlier, the le g isla tio n th at is likely to be enacted by C o n gress w ill lim it b en eficiaries' an nual lia b ilitie s, perhaps between $1,500 and $ 2 ,0 0 0 . T h e le g isla tio n m ay also in clu d e so m e benefits for prescription d r u g s, w h ich u n til now have not been covered at all.
The question p e rtin e n t to th is article is w h ether such ch an ges w ill improve the efficiency o f h ealth care cov erage for the elderly.
U sing the fram ew ork laid o u t in th is article , the le g isla tio n is not likely to im prove the situ a tio n . I have arg u e d th at the key to success is enacting program m atic changes that w ill sim plify M edicare's benefits, thereby im p ro vin g c o n su m e rs' in fo rm atio n an d allo w in g th em to m ak e choices that are in th eir b est in te re sts. T h e le g isla tio n now b ein g considered by C o n g re ss, u n fo rtu n ate ly , m ak es m atters even m ore con Medicare reasonable ch arge-th at is, re q u irin g a ssig n m e n t on all p h y sician services. Im p ro v e m e n t in lo n g -te rm care is lik ely to com e ab o u t only when M ed icare e lim in a te s th e d istin c tio n betw een acu te and long-term stays, an d rem oves all o f the oth er tech n icalities th at prevent most stays from receiv in g cov erage.
In conclusion, there are m a jo r p ro b le m s in heren t in our cou n try's system o f p ro v id in g h ealth care ben efits to its eld erly citizen s. M any of these p rob lem s ste m fro m th e co n fu sin g n atu re o f coverage for the various health care services that these people need. Perhaps this confusion is an inevitable con seq u en ce o f th e federal g o v e rn m e n t's desire to 
